fix(security): block workspace hardlink alias escapes

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-02-26 03:42:22 +01:00
parent 53fcfdf794
commit 04d91d0319
8 changed files with 176 additions and 21 deletions

View File

@@ -195,6 +195,42 @@ describe("sandbox fs bridge shell compatibility", () => {
await fs.rm(stateDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it("rejects pre-existing host hardlink escapes before docker exec", async () => {
if (process.platform === "win32") {
return;
}
const stateDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "openclaw-fs-bridge-hardlink-"));
const workspaceDir = path.join(stateDir, "workspace");
const outsideDir = path.join(stateDir, "outside");
const outsideFile = path.join(outsideDir, "secret.txt");
await fs.mkdir(workspaceDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.mkdir(outsideDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.writeFile(outsideFile, "classified");
const hardlinkPath = path.join(workspaceDir, "link.txt");
try {
try {
await fs.link(outsideFile, hardlinkPath);
} catch (err) {
if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "EXDEV") {
return;
}
throw err;
}
const bridge = createSandboxFsBridge({
sandbox: createSandbox({
workspaceDir,
agentWorkspaceDir: workspaceDir,
}),
});
await expect(bridge.readFile({ filePath: "link.txt" })).rejects.toThrow(/hardlink|sandbox/i);
expect(mockedExecDockerRaw).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
} finally {
await fs.rm(stateDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it("rejects container-canonicalized paths outside allowed mounts", async () => {
mockedExecDockerRaw.mockImplementation(async (args) => {
const script = getDockerScript(args);

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import fs from "node:fs/promises";
import path from "node:path";
import { assertNoHardlinkedFinalPath } from "../../infra/hardlink-guards.js";
import { isNotFoundPathError, isPathInside } from "../../infra/path-guards.js";
import { execDockerRaw, type ExecDockerRawResult } from "./docker.js";
import {
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ type RunCommandOptions = {
type PathSafetyOptions = {
action: string;
allowFinalSymlink?: boolean;
allowFinalHardlink?: boolean;
requireWritable?: boolean;
};
@@ -151,6 +153,7 @@ class SandboxFsBridgeImpl implements SandboxFsBridge {
action: "remove files",
requireWritable: true,
allowFinalSymlink: true,
allowFinalHardlink: true,
});
const flags = [params.force === false ? "" : "-f", params.recursive ? "-r" : ""].filter(
Boolean,
@@ -176,6 +179,7 @@ class SandboxFsBridgeImpl implements SandboxFsBridge {
action: "rename files",
requireWritable: true,
allowFinalSymlink: true,
allowFinalHardlink: true,
});
await this.assertPathSafety(to, {
action: "rename files",
@@ -257,6 +261,12 @@ class SandboxFsBridgeImpl implements SandboxFsBridge {
rootPath: lexicalMount.hostRoot,
allowFinalSymlink: options.allowFinalSymlink === true,
});
await assertNoHardlinkedFinalPath({
filePath: target.hostPath,
root: lexicalMount.hostRoot,
boundaryLabel: "sandbox mount root",
allowFinalHardlink: options.allowFinalHardlink === true,
});
const canonicalContainerPath = await this.resolveCanonicalContainerPath({
containerPath: target.containerPath,