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feat(gateway): add trusted-proxy auth mode (#15940)

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Merged via /review-pr -> /prepare-pr -> /merge-pr.

Prepared head SHA: 279d4b304f
Co-authored-by: nickytonline <833231+nickytonline@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: steipete <58493+steipete@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-by: @steipete
This commit is contained in:
Nick Taylor
2026-02-14 06:32:17 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent 3a330e681b
commit 1fb52b4d7b
28 changed files with 1867 additions and 92 deletions
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77
src/security/audit.ts
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@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import { collectChannelSecurityFindings } from "./audit-channel.js";
import {
collectAttackSurfaceSummaryFindings,
collectExposureMatrixFindings,
collectGatewayHttpSessionKeyOverrideFindings,
collectHooksHardeningFindings,
collectIncludeFilePermFindings,
collectInstalledSkillsCodeSafetyFindings,
@@ -257,10 +258,7 @@ function collectGatewayConfigFindings(
(auth.mode === "token" && hasToken) || (auth.mode === "password" && hasPassword);
const hasTailscaleAuth = auth.allowTailscale && tailscaleMode === "serve";
const hasGatewayAuth = hasSharedSecret || hasTailscaleAuth;
const remotelyExposed =
bind !== "loopback" || tailscaleMode === "serve" || tailscaleMode === "funnel";
if (bind !== "loopback" && !hasSharedSecret) {
if (bind !== "loopback" && !hasSharedSecret && auth.mode !== "trusted-proxy") {
findings.push({
checkId: "gateway.bind_no_auth",
severity: "critical",
@@ -346,26 +344,66 @@ function collectGatewayConfigFindings(
});
}
const chatCompletionsEnabled = cfg.gateway?.http?.endpoints?.chatCompletions?.enabled === true;
const responsesEnabled = cfg.gateway?.http?.endpoints?.responses?.enabled === true;
if (chatCompletionsEnabled || responsesEnabled) {
const enabledEndpoints = [
chatCompletionsEnabled ? "/v1/chat/completions" : null,
responsesEnabled ? "/v1/responses" : null,
].filter((value): value is string => Boolean(value));
if (auth.mode === "trusted-proxy") {
const trustedProxies = cfg.gateway?.trustedProxies ?? [];
const trustedProxyConfig = cfg.gateway?.auth?.trustedProxy;
findings.push({
checkId: "gateway.http.session_key_override_enabled",
severity: remotelyExposed ? "warn" : "info",
title: "HTTP APIs accept explicit session key override headers",
checkId: "gateway.trusted_proxy_auth",
severity: "critical",
title: "Trusted-proxy auth mode enabled",
detail:
`${enabledEndpoints.join(", ")} support x-openclaw-session-key. ` +
"Any authenticated caller can route requests into arbitrary sessions.",
'gateway.auth.mode="trusted-proxy" delegates authentication to a reverse proxy. ' +
"Ensure your proxy (Pomerium, Caddy, nginx) handles auth correctly and that gateway.trustedProxies " +
"only contains IPs of your actual proxy servers.",
remediation:
"Treat HTTP API credentials as full-trust, disable unused endpoints, and avoid sharing tokens across tenants.",
"Verify: (1) Your proxy terminates TLS and authenticates users. " +
"(2) gateway.trustedProxies is restricted to proxy IPs only. " +
"(3) Direct access to the Gateway port is blocked by firewall. " +
"See /gateway/trusted-proxy-auth for setup guidance.",
});
if (trustedProxies.length === 0) {
findings.push({
checkId: "gateway.trusted_proxy_no_proxies",
severity: "critical",
title: "Trusted-proxy auth enabled but no trusted proxies configured",
detail:
'gateway.auth.mode="trusted-proxy" but gateway.trustedProxies is empty. ' +
"All requests will be rejected.",
remediation: "Set gateway.trustedProxies to the IP(s) of your reverse proxy.",
});
}
if (!trustedProxyConfig?.userHeader) {
findings.push({
checkId: "gateway.trusted_proxy_no_user_header",
severity: "critical",
title: "Trusted-proxy auth missing userHeader config",
detail:
'gateway.auth.mode="trusted-proxy" but gateway.auth.trustedProxy.userHeader is not configured.',
remediation:
"Set gateway.auth.trustedProxy.userHeader to the header name your proxy uses " +
'(e.g., "x-forwarded-user", "x-pomerium-claim-email").',
});
}
const allowUsers = trustedProxyConfig?.allowUsers ?? [];
if (allowUsers.length === 0) {
findings.push({
checkId: "gateway.trusted_proxy_no_allowlist",
severity: "warn",
title: "Trusted-proxy auth allows all authenticated users",
detail:
"gateway.auth.trustedProxy.allowUsers is empty, so any user authenticated by your proxy can access the Gateway.",
remediation:
"Consider setting gateway.auth.trustedProxy.allowUsers to restrict access to specific users " +
'(e.g., ["nick@example.com"]).',
});
}
}
if (bind !== "loopback" && !cfg.gateway?.auth?.rateLimit) {
if (bind !== "loopback" && auth.mode !== "trusted-proxy" && !cfg.gateway?.auth?.rateLimit) {
findings.push({
checkId: "gateway.auth_no_rate_limit",
severity: "warn",
@@ -570,7 +608,8 @@ export async function runSecurityAudit(opts: SecurityAuditOptions): Promise<Secu
findings.push(...collectBrowserControlFindings(cfg, env));
findings.push(...collectLoggingFindings(cfg));
findings.push(...collectElevatedFindings(cfg));
findings.push(...collectHooksHardeningFindings(cfg));
findings.push(...collectHooksHardeningFindings(cfg, env));
findings.push(...collectGatewayHttpSessionKeyOverrideFindings(cfg));
findings.push(...collectSandboxDockerNoopFindings(cfg));
findings.push(...collectNodeDenyCommandPatternFindings(cfg));
findings.push(...collectMinimalProfileOverrideFindings(cfg));