fix(security): block zip symlink escape in archive extraction

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-02-21 19:42:11 +01:00
parent ddcb2d79b1
commit 4b226b74f5
3 changed files with 161 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -79,6 +79,32 @@ describe("archive utils", () => {
).rejects.toThrow(/(escapes destination|absolute)/i);
});
it("rejects zip entries that traverse pre-existing destination symlinks", async () => {
const workDir = await makeTempDir();
const archivePath = path.join(workDir, "bundle.zip");
const extractDir = path.join(workDir, "extract");
const outsideDir = path.join(workDir, "outside");
await fs.mkdir(extractDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.mkdir(outsideDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.symlink(outsideDir, path.join(extractDir, "escape"));
const zip = new JSZip();
zip.file("escape/pwn.txt", "owned");
await fs.writeFile(archivePath, await zip.generateAsync({ type: "nodebuffer" }));
await expect(
extractArchive({ archivePath, destDir: extractDir, timeoutMs: 5_000 }),
).rejects.toThrow(/symlink/i);
const outsideFile = path.join(outsideDir, "pwn.txt");
const outsideExists = await fs
.stat(outsideFile)
.then(() => true)
.catch(() => false);
expect(outsideExists).toBe(false);
});
it("extracts tar archives", async () => {
const workDir = await makeTempDir();
const archivePath = path.join(workDir, "bundle.tar");