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Gateway/ws: clear unbound scopes for shared-token auth (#44306)

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* Gateway/ws: clear unbound shared-auth scopes

* Gateway/auth: cover shared-token scope stripping

* Changelog: add shared-token scope stripping entry

* Gateway/ws: preserve allowed control-ui scopes

* Gateway/auth: assert control-ui admin scopes survive allowed device-less auth

* Gateway/auth: cover shared-password scope stripping
This commit is contained in:
Vincent Koc
2026-03-12 14:52:24 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 55f47e5ce6
commit 5e389d5e7c
4 changed files with 51 additions and 4 deletions
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CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
- Security/exec approvals: escape invisible Unicode format characters in approval prompts so zero-width command text renders as visible `\u{...}` escapes instead of spoofing the reviewed command. (`GHSA-pcqg-f7rg-xfvv`)(#43687) Thanks @EkiXu and @vincentkoc.
- Security/exec detection: normalize compatibility Unicode and strip invisible formatting code points before obfuscation checks so zero-width and fullwidth command tricks no longer suppress heuristic detection. (`GHSA-9r3v-37xh-2cf6`)(#44091) Thanks @wooluo and @vincentkoc.
- Security/exec allowlist: preserve POSIX case sensitivity and keep `?` within a single path segment so exact-looking allowlist patterns no longer overmatch executables across case or directory boundaries. (`GHSA-f8r2-vg7x-gh8m`)(#43798) Thanks @zpbrent and @vincentkoc.
- Security/gateway auth: clear unbound client-declared scopes on shared-token WebSocket connects so device-less shared-token operators cannot self-declare elevated scopes. (`GHSA-rqpp-rjj8-7wv8`)(#44306) Thanks @LUOYEcode and @vincentkoc.
- Security/browser.request: block persistent browser profile create/delete routes from write-scoped `browser.request` so callers can no longer persist admin-only browser profile changes through the browser control surface. (`GHSA-vmhq-cqm9-6p7q`)(#43800) Thanks @tdjackey and @vincentkoc.
- Security/agent: reject public spawned-run lineage fields and keep workspace inheritance on the internal spawned-session path so external `agent` callers can no longer override the gateway workspace boundary. (`GHSA-2rqg-gjgv-84jm`)(#43801) Thanks @tdjackey and @vincentkoc.
- Security/session_status: enforce sandbox session-tree visibility and shared agent-to-agent access guards before reading or mutating target session state, so sandboxed subagents can no longer inspect parent session metadata or write parent model overrides via `session_status`. (`GHSA-wcxr-59v9-rxr8`)(#43754) Thanks @tdjackey and @vincentkoc.