fix(security): block private/loopback/metadata IPs in link-understanding URL detection (#15604)

* fix(security): block private/loopback/metadata IPs in link-understanding URL detection

isAllowedUrl() only blocked 127.0.0.1, leaving localhost, ::1, 0.0.0.0,
private RFC1918 ranges, link-local (169.254.x.x including cloud metadata),
and CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10) accessible for SSRF via link-understanding.

Add comprehensive hostname/IP blocking consistent with the SSRF guard
already used by media/fetch.ts.

* fix(security): harden link-understanding SSRF host checks

* fix: note link-understanding SSRF hardening in changelog (#15604) (thanks @AI-Reviewer-QS)

---------

Co-authored-by: Yi LIU <yi@quantstamp.com>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
AI-Reviewer-QS
2026-02-14 01:38:40 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent fdfc34fa1f
commit 649826e435
3 changed files with 53 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
import { isBlockedHostname, isPrivateIpAddress } from "../infra/net/ssrf.js";
import { DEFAULT_MAX_LINKS } from "./defaults.js";
// Remove markdown link syntax so only bare URLs are considered.
@@ -21,7 +22,7 @@ function isAllowedUrl(raw: string): boolean {
if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") {
return false;
}
if (parsed.hostname === "127.0.0.1") {
if (isBlockedHost(parsed.hostname)) {
return false;
}
return true;
@@ -30,6 +31,16 @@ function isAllowedUrl(raw: string): boolean {
}
}
/** Block loopback, private, link-local, and metadata addresses. */
function isBlockedHost(hostname: string): boolean {
const normalized = hostname.trim().toLowerCase();
return (
normalized === "localhost.localdomain" ||
isBlockedHostname(normalized) ||
isPrivateIpAddress(normalized)
);
}
export function extractLinksFromMessage(message: string, opts?: { maxLinks?: number }): string[] {
const source = message?.trim();
if (!source) {