diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index dcb1e9f6209..d8c53f815bd 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 
 - Security/Commands: enforce sender-only matching for `commands.allowFrom` by blocking conversation-shaped `From` identities (`channel:`, `group:`, `thread:`, `@g.us`) while preserving direct-message fallback when sender fields are missing. Ships in the next npm release. Thanks @jiseoung.
 - Config/Kilo Gateway: Kilo provider flow now surfaces an updated list of models. (#24921) thanks @gumadeiras.
+- Security/Sandbox: enforce `tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly` and `tools.fs.workspaceOnly` for `apply_patch` in sandbox-mounted paths so writes/deletes cannot escape the workspace boundary via mounts like `/agent` unless explicitly opted out (`tools.exec.applyPatch.workspaceOnly=false`). This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/Config writes: block reserved prototype keys in account-id normalization and route account config resolution through own-key lookups, hardening `/allowlist` and account-scoped config paths against prototype-chain pollution.
 - Security/Exec: harden `safeBins` long-option validation by rejecting unknown/ambiguous GNU long-option abbreviations and denying sort filesystem-dependent flags (`--random-source`, `--temporary-directory`, `-T`), closing safe-bin denylist bypasses. Thanks @jiseoung.
 - Security/Channels: unify dangerous name-matching policy checks (`dangerouslyAllowNameMatching`) across core and extension channels, share mutable-allowlist detectors between `openclaw doctor` and `openclaw security audit`, and scan all configured accounts (not only the default account) in channel security audit findings.
diff --git a/src/agents/apply-patch.ts b/src/agents/apply-patch.ts
index ef756b37a25..fecf4cf03bc 100644
--- a/src/agents/apply-patch.ts
+++ b/src/agents/apply-patch.ts
@@ -260,6 +260,14 @@ async function resolvePatchPath(
       filePath,
       cwd: options.cwd,
     });
+    if (options.workspaceOnly !== false) {
+      await assertSandboxPath({
+        filePath: resolved.hostPath,
+        cwd: options.cwd,
+        root: options.cwd,
+        allowFinalSymlink: purpose === "unlink",
+      });
+    }
     return {
       resolved: resolved.hostPath,
       display: resolved.relativePath || resolved.hostPath,
diff --git a/src/agents/pi-tools.sandbox-mounted-paths.workspace-only.test.ts b/src/agents/pi-tools.sandbox-mounted-paths.workspace-only.test.ts
index f40489f20ef..77fd1f724f5 100644
--- a/src/agents/pi-tools.sandbox-mounted-paths.workspace-only.test.ts
+++ b/src/agents/pi-tools.sandbox-mounted-paths.workspace-only.test.ts
@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ function createSandbox(params: {
   });
 }
 
+type ToolWithExecute = {
+  execute: (toolCallId: string, args: unknown, signal?: AbortSignal) => Promise<unknown>;
+};
+
 async function withUnsafeMountedSandboxHarness(
   run: (ctx: { sandboxRoot: string; agentRoot: string; sandbox: SandboxContext }) => Promise<void>,
 ) {
@@ -131,4 +135,74 @@ describe("tools.fs.workspaceOnly", () => {
       expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(agentRoot, "secret.txt"), "utf8")).toBe("shh");
     });
   });
+
+  it("enforces apply_patch workspace-only in sandbox mounts by default", async () => {
+    await withUnsafeMountedSandboxHarness(async ({ sandboxRoot, agentRoot, sandbox }) => {
+      const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {
+        tools: {
+          allow: ["read", "exec"],
+          exec: { applyPatch: { enabled: true } },
+        },
+      };
+      const tools = createOpenClawCodingTools({
+        sandbox,
+        workspaceDir: sandboxRoot,
+        config: cfg,
+        modelProvider: "openai",
+        modelId: "gpt-5.2",
+      });
+      const applyPatchTool = tools.find((t) => t.name === "apply_patch") as
+        | ToolWithExecute
+        | undefined;
+      if (!applyPatchTool) {
+        throw new Error("apply_patch tool missing");
+      }
+
+      const patch = `*** Begin Patch
+*** Add File: /agent/pwned.txt
++owned-by-apply-patch
+*** End Patch`;
+
+      await expect(applyPatchTool.execute("t1", { input: patch })).rejects.toThrow(
+        /Path escapes sandbox root/i,
+      );
+      await expect(fs.stat(path.join(agentRoot, "pwned.txt"))).rejects.toMatchObject({
+        code: "ENOENT",
+      });
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("allows apply_patch outside workspace root when explicitly disabled", async () => {
+    await withUnsafeMountedSandboxHarness(async ({ sandboxRoot, agentRoot, sandbox }) => {
+      const cfg: OpenClawConfig = {
+        tools: {
+          allow: ["read", "exec"],
+          exec: { applyPatch: { enabled: true, workspaceOnly: false } },
+        },
+      };
+      const tools = createOpenClawCodingTools({
+        sandbox,
+        workspaceDir: sandboxRoot,
+        config: cfg,
+        modelProvider: "openai",
+        modelId: "gpt-5.2",
+      });
+      const applyPatchTool = tools.find((t) => t.name === "apply_patch") as
+        | ToolWithExecute
+        | undefined;
+      if (!applyPatchTool) {
+        throw new Error("apply_patch tool missing");
+      }
+
+      const patch = `*** Begin Patch
+*** Add File: /agent/pwned.txt
++owned-by-apply-patch
+*** End Patch`;
+
+      await applyPatchTool.execute("t2", { input: patch });
+      expect(await fs.readFile(path.join(agentRoot, "pwned.txt"), "utf8")).toBe(
+        "owned-by-apply-patch\n",
+      );
+    });
+  });
 });