diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index b74f1d444c8..dd9255de381 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 
 ### Fixes
 
+- Gateway/Security: enforce gateway auth for the exact `/api/channels` plugin root path (plus `/api/channels/` descendants), with regression coverage for query/trailing-slash variants and near-miss paths that must remain plugin-owned. (#25753) Thanks @bmendonca3.
+- Security/Exec: sanitize inherited host execution environment before merge, canonicalize inherited PATH handling, and strip dangerous keys (`LD_*`, `DYLD_*`, `SSLKEYLOGFILE`, and related injection vectors) from non-sandboxed exec runs. (#25755) Thanks @bmendonca3.
+- Security/Hooks: normalize hook session-key classification with trim/lowercase plus Unicode NFKC folding (for example full-width `ＨＯＯＫ：...`) so external-content wrapping cannot be bypassed by mixed-case or lookalike prefixes. (#25750) Thanks @bmendonca3.
+- Security/Voice Call: add Telnyx webhook replay detection and canonicalize replay-key signature encoding (Base64/Base64URL equivalent forms dedupe together), so duplicate signed webhook deliveries no longer re-trigger side effects. (#25832) Thanks @bmendonca3.
 - Discord/Block streaming: restore block-streamed reply delivery by suppressing only reasoning payloads (instead of all `block` payloads), fixing missing Discord replies in `channels.discord.streaming=block` mode. (#25839, #25836, #25792) Thanks @pewallin.
 - Matrix/Read receipts: send read receipts as soon as Matrix messages arrive (before handler pipeline work), so clients no longer show long-lived unread/sent states while replies are processing. (#25841, #25840) Thanks @joshjhall.
 - Sandbox/FS bridge: build canonical-path shell scripts with newline separators (not `; ` joins) to avoid POSIX `sh` `do;` syntax errors that broke sandbox file/image read-write operations. (#25737, #25824, #25868) Thanks @DennisGoldfinger and @peteragility.
@@ -598,7 +602,6 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Security/Media: harden local media ingestion against TOCTOU/symlink swap attacks by pinning reads to a single file descriptor with symlink rejection and inode/device verification in `saveMediaSource`. Thanks @dorjoos for reporting.
 - Security/Lobster (Windows): for the next npm release, remove shell-based fallback when launching Lobster wrappers (`.cmd`/`.bat`) and switch to explicit argv execution with wrapper entrypoint resolution, preventing command injection while preserving Windows wrapper compatibility. Thanks @allsmog for reporting.
 - Security/Exec: require `tools.exec.safeBins` binaries to resolve from trusted bin directories (system defaults plus gateway startup `PATH`) so PATH-hijacked trojan binaries cannot bypass allowlist checks. Thanks @jackhax for reporting.
-- Security/Exec: sanitize inherited host execution environment before merge and strip dangerous keys (`LD_*`, `DYLD_*`, `SSLKEYLOGFILE`, and related injection vectors) from non-sandboxed exec runs. (#9792)
 - Security/Exec: remove file-existence oracle behavior from `tools.exec.safeBins` by using deterministic argv-only stdin-safe validation and blocking file-oriented flags (for example `sort -o`, `jq -f`, `grep -f`) so allow/deny results no longer disclose host file presence. Thanks @nedlir for reporting.
 - Security/Browser: route browser URL navigation through one SSRF-guarded validation path for tab-open/CDP-target/Playwright navigation flows and block private/metadata destinations by default (configurable via `browser.ssrfPolicy`). Thanks @dorjoos for reporting.
 - Security/Exec: for the next npm release, harden safe-bin stdin-only enforcement by blocking output/recursive flags (`sort -o/--output`, grep recursion) and tightening default safe bins to remove `sort`/`grep`, preventing safe-bin allowlist bypass for file writes/recursive reads. Thanks @nedlir for reporting.
diff --git a/extensions/voice-call/src/providers/telnyx.test.ts b/extensions/voice-call/src/providers/telnyx.test.ts
index 7fcd756b943..e81c41376a3 100644
--- a/extensions/voice-call/src/providers/telnyx.test.ts
+++ b/extensions/voice-call/src/providers/telnyx.test.ts
@@ -136,4 +136,52 @@ describe("TelnyxProvider.verifyWebhook", () => {
     expect(second.ok).toBe(true);
     expect(second.isReplay).toBe(true);
   });
+
+  it("treats base64url signature variants as replay of the same request", () => {
+    const { publicKey, privateKey } = crypto.generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
+    const spkiDer = publicKey.export({ format: "der", type: "spki" }) as Buffer;
+    const provider = new TelnyxProvider(
+      { apiKey: "KEY123", connectionId: "CONN456", publicKey: spkiDer.toString("base64") },
+      { skipVerification: false },
+    );
+
+    const rawBody = JSON.stringify({
+      event_type: "call.initiated",
+      payload: { call_control_id: "call-replay-test-url" },
+      nonce: crypto.randomUUID(),
+    });
+    const timestamp = String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
+    const signedPayload = `${timestamp}|${rawBody}`;
+    const signatureBase64 = crypto
+      .sign(null, Buffer.from(signedPayload), privateKey)
+      .toString("base64");
+    const signatureBase64Url = signatureBase64
+      .replace(/\+/g, "-")
+      .replace(/\//g, "_")
+      .replace(/=+$/g, "");
+
+    const first = provider.verifyWebhook(
+      createCtx({
+        rawBody,
+        headers: {
+          "telnyx-signature-ed25519": signatureBase64,
+          "telnyx-timestamp": timestamp,
+        },
+      }),
+    );
+    const second = provider.verifyWebhook(
+      createCtx({
+        rawBody,
+        headers: {
+          "telnyx-signature-ed25519": signatureBase64Url,
+          "telnyx-timestamp": timestamp,
+        },
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(first.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(first.isReplay).toBeFalsy();
+    expect(second.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(second.isReplay).toBe(true);
+  });
 });
diff --git a/extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.test.ts b/extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.test.ts
index e85838a1383..9b7be8b7b40 100644
--- a/extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.test.ts
+++ b/extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.test.ts
@@ -232,6 +232,54 @@ describe("verifyTelnyxWebhook", () => {
     expect(second.ok).toBe(true);
     expect(second.isReplay).toBe(true);
   });
+
+  it("detects replay across equivalent base64/base64url signature encodings", () => {
+    const { publicKey, privateKey } = crypto.generateKeyPairSync("ed25519");
+    const pemPublicKey = publicKey.export({ format: "pem", type: "spki" }).toString();
+    const timestamp = String(Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));
+    const rawBody = JSON.stringify({
+      data: { event_type: "call.answered", payload: { call_control_id: "call-2" } },
+      nonce: crypto.randomUUID(),
+    });
+    const signedPayload = `${timestamp}|${rawBody}`;
+    const signatureBase64 = crypto
+      .sign(null, Buffer.from(signedPayload), privateKey)
+      .toString("base64");
+    const signatureBase64Url = signatureBase64
+      .replace(/\+/g, "-")
+      .replace(/\//g, "_")
+      .replace(/=+$/g, "");
+
+    const first = verifyTelnyxWebhook(
+      {
+        headers: {
+          "telnyx-signature-ed25519": signatureBase64,
+          "telnyx-timestamp": timestamp,
+        },
+        rawBody,
+        url: "https://example.com/voice/webhook",
+        method: "POST",
+      },
+      pemPublicKey,
+    );
+    const second = verifyTelnyxWebhook(
+      {
+        headers: {
+          "telnyx-signature-ed25519": signatureBase64Url,
+          "telnyx-timestamp": timestamp,
+        },
+        rawBody,
+        url: "https://example.com/voice/webhook",
+        method: "POST",
+      },
+      pemPublicKey,
+    );
+
+    expect(first.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(first.isReplay).toBeFalsy();
+    expect(second.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(second.isReplay).toBe(true);
+  });
 });
 
 describe("verifyTwilioWebhook", () => {
diff --git a/extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.ts b/extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.ts
index d190ed8f9ff..f20f0cd2a0a 100644
--- a/extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.ts
+++ b/extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.ts
@@ -401,6 +401,18 @@ export interface TelnyxVerificationResult {
   isReplay?: boolean;
 }
 
+function createTelnyxReplayKey(params: {
+  timestampSec: number;
+  signatureBytes: Buffer;
+  rawBody: string;
+}): string {
+  // Canonicalize signature/timestamp so equivalent header encodings
+  // (for example Base64 vs Base64URL) map to the same replay key.
+  return `telnyx:${sha256Hex(
+    `${params.timestampSec}\n${params.signatureBytes.toString("base64")}\n${params.rawBody}`,
+  )}`;
+}
+
 function createTwilioReplayKey(params: {
   ctx: WebhookContext;
   signature: string;
@@ -506,7 +518,11 @@ export function verifyTelnyxWebhook(
       return { ok: false, reason: "Timestamp too old" };
     }
 
-    const replayKey = `telnyx:${sha256Hex(`${timestamp}\n${signature}\n${ctx.rawBody}`)}`;
+    const replayKey = createTelnyxReplayKey({
+      timestampSec: eventTimeSec,
+      signatureBytes: signatureBuffer,
+      rawBody: ctx.rawBody,
+    });
     const isReplay = markReplay(telnyxReplayCache, replayKey);
     return { ok: true, isReplay };
   } catch (err) {