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fix(gateway): harden token fallback/reconnect behavior and docs (#42507)
* fix(gateway): harden token fallback and auth reconnect handling * docs(gateway): clarify auth retry and token-drift recovery * fix(gateway): tighten auth reconnect gating across clients * fix: harden gateway token retry (#42507) (thanks @joshavant)
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@@ -262,9 +262,14 @@ High-signal `checkId` values you will most likely see in real deployments (not e
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## Control UI over HTTP
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The Control UI needs a **secure context** (HTTPS or localhost) to generate device
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identity. `gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth` does **not** bypass secure-context,
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device-identity, or device-pairing checks. Prefer HTTPS (Tailscale Serve) or open
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the UI on `127.0.0.1`.
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identity. `gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth` is a local compatibility toggle:
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- On localhost, it allows Control UI auth without device identity when the page
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is loaded over non-secure HTTP.
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- It does not bypass pairing checks.
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- It does not relax remote (non-localhost) device identity requirements.
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Prefer HTTPS (Tailscale Serve) or open the UI on `127.0.0.1`.
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For break-glass scenarios only, `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth`
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disables device identity checks entirely. This is a severe security downgrade;
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