Exec/ACP: inject OPENCLAW_SHELL into child shell env (#31271)

* exec: mark runtime shell context in exec env

* tests(exec): cover OPENCLAW_SHELL in gateway exec

* tests(exec): cover OPENCLAW_SHELL in pty mode

* acpx: mark runtime shell context for spawned process

* tests(acpx): log OPENCLAW_SHELL in runtime fixture

* tests(acpx): assert OPENCLAW_SHELL in runtime prompt

* docs(env): document OPENCLAW_SHELL runtime markers

* docs(exec): describe OPENCLAW_SHELL exec marker

* docs(acp): document OPENCLAW_SHELL acp marker

* docs(gateway): note OPENCLAW_SHELL for background exec

* tui: tag local shell runs with OPENCLAW_SHELL

* tests(tui): assert OPENCLAW_SHELL in local shell runner

* acp client: tag spawned bridge env with OPENCLAW_SHELL

* tests(acp): cover acp client OPENCLAW_SHELL env helper

* docs(env): include acp-client and tui-local shell markers

* docs(acp): document acp-client OPENCLAW_SHELL marker

* docs(tui): document tui-local OPENCLAW_SHELL marker

* exec: keep shell runtime env string-only for docker args

* changelog: note OPENCLAW_SHELL runtime markers
This commit is contained in:
Vincent Koc
2026-03-01 20:31:06 -08:00
committed by GitHub
parent aeb817353f
commit b7615e0ce3
16 changed files with 145 additions and 7 deletions

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@@ -179,6 +179,8 @@ Security note:
- `--token` and `--password` can be visible in local process listings on some systems.
- Prefer `--token-file`/`--password-file` or environment variables (`OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN`, `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD`).
- ACP runtime backend child processes receive `OPENCLAW_SHELL=acp`, which can be used for context-specific shell/profile rules.
- `openclaw acp client` sets `OPENCLAW_SHELL=acp-client` on the spawned bridge process.
### `acp client` options

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@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ Behavior:
- When backgrounded (explicit or timeout), the tool returns `status: "running"` + `sessionId` and a short tail.
- Output is kept in memory until the session is polled or cleared.
- If the `process` tool is disallowed, `exec` runs synchronously and ignores `yieldMs`/`background`.
- Spawned exec commands receive `OPENCLAW_SHELL=exec` for context-aware shell/profile rules.
## Child process bridging

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@@ -56,6 +56,18 @@ Env var equivalents:
- `OPENCLAW_LOAD_SHELL_ENV=1`
- `OPENCLAW_SHELL_ENV_TIMEOUT_MS=15000`
## Runtime-injected env vars
OpenClaw also injects context markers into spawned child processes:
- `OPENCLAW_SHELL=exec`: set for commands run through the `exec` tool.
- `OPENCLAW_SHELL=acp`: set for ACP runtime backend process spawns (for example `acpx`).
- `OPENCLAW_SHELL=acp-client`: set for `openclaw acp client` when it spawns the ACP bridge process.
- `OPENCLAW_SHELL=tui-local`: set for local TUI `!` shell commands.
These are runtime markers (not required user config). They can be used in shell/profile logic
to apply context-specific rules.
## Env var substitution in config
You can reference env vars directly in config string values using `${VAR_NAME}` syntax:

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@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ Notes:
then falls back to Windows PowerShell 5.1.
- Host execution (`gateway`/`node`) rejects `env.PATH` and loader overrides (`LD_*`/`DYLD_*`) to
prevent binary hijacking or injected code.
- OpenClaw sets `OPENCLAW_SHELL=exec` in the spawned command environment (including PTY and sandbox execution) so shell/profile rules can detect exec-tool context.
- Important: sandboxing is **off by default**. If sandboxing is off and `host=sandbox` is explicitly
configured/requested, exec now fails closed instead of silently running on the gateway host.
Enable sandboxing or use `host=gateway` with approvals.

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@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ Other Gateway slash commands (for example, `/context`) are forwarded to the Gate
- Prefix a line with `!` to run a local shell command on the TUI host.
- The TUI prompts once per session to allow local execution; declining keeps `!` disabled for the session.
- Commands run in a fresh, non-interactive shell in the TUI working directory (no persistent `cd`/env).
- Local shell commands receive `OPENCLAW_SHELL=tui-local` in their environment.
- A lone `!` is sent as a normal message; leading spaces do not trigger local exec.
## Tool output