mirror of
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw.git
synced 2026-05-11 16:03:43 +00:00
fix: harden sandbox media reads against TOCTOU escapes
This commit is contained in:
@@ -3,8 +3,11 @@ import path from "node:path";
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import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { createTrackedTempDirs } from "../test-utils/tracked-temp-dirs.js";
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import {
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createRootScopedReadFile,
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SafeOpenError,
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openFileWithinRoot,
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readFileWithinRoot,
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readPathWithinRoot,
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readLocalFileSafely,
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writeFileWithinRoot,
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} from "./fs-safe.js";
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@@ -70,6 +73,37 @@ describe("fs-safe", () => {
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).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "outside-workspace" });
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});
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it("reads a file within root", async () => {
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const root = await tempDirs.make("openclaw-fs-safe-root-");
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await fs.writeFile(path.join(root, "inside.txt"), "inside");
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const result = await readFileWithinRoot({
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rootDir: root,
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relativePath: "inside.txt",
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});
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expect(result.buffer.toString("utf8")).toBe("inside");
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expect(result.realPath).toContain("inside.txt");
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expect(result.stat.size).toBe(6);
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});
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it("reads an absolute path within root via readPathWithinRoot", async () => {
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const root = await tempDirs.make("openclaw-fs-safe-root-");
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const insidePath = path.join(root, "absolute.txt");
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await fs.writeFile(insidePath, "absolute");
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const result = await readPathWithinRoot({
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rootDir: root,
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filePath: insidePath,
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});
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expect(result.buffer.toString("utf8")).toBe("absolute");
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});
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it("creates a root-scoped read callback", async () => {
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const root = await tempDirs.make("openclaw-fs-safe-root-");
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const insidePath = path.join(root, "scoped.txt");
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await fs.writeFile(insidePath, "scoped");
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const readScoped = createRootScopedReadFile({ rootDir: root });
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await expect(readScoped(insidePath)).resolves.toEqual(Buffer.from("scoped"));
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});
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it.runIf(process.platform !== "win32")("blocks symlink escapes under root", async () => {
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const root = await tempDirs.make("openclaw-fs-safe-root-");
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const outside = await tempDirs.make("openclaw-fs-safe-outside-");
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@@ -165,6 +165,71 @@ export async function openFileWithinRoot(params: {
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return opened;
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}
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export async function readFileWithinRoot(params: {
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rootDir: string;
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relativePath: string;
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rejectHardlinks?: boolean;
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maxBytes?: number;
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}): Promise<SafeLocalReadResult> {
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const opened = await openFileWithinRoot({
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rootDir: params.rootDir,
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relativePath: params.relativePath,
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rejectHardlinks: params.rejectHardlinks,
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});
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try {
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if (params.maxBytes !== undefined && opened.stat.size > params.maxBytes) {
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throw new SafeOpenError(
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"too-large",
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`file exceeds limit of ${params.maxBytes} bytes (got ${opened.stat.size})`,
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);
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}
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const buffer = await opened.handle.readFile();
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return {
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buffer,
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realPath: opened.realPath,
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stat: opened.stat,
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};
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} finally {
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await opened.handle.close().catch(() => {});
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}
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}
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export async function readPathWithinRoot(params: {
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rootDir: string;
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filePath: string;
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rejectHardlinks?: boolean;
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maxBytes?: number;
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}): Promise<SafeLocalReadResult> {
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const rootDir = path.resolve(params.rootDir);
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const candidatePath = path.isAbsolute(params.filePath)
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? path.resolve(params.filePath)
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: path.resolve(rootDir, params.filePath);
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const relativePath = path.relative(rootDir, candidatePath);
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return await readFileWithinRoot({
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rootDir,
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relativePath,
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rejectHardlinks: params.rejectHardlinks,
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maxBytes: params.maxBytes,
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});
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}
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export function createRootScopedReadFile(params: {
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rootDir: string;
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rejectHardlinks?: boolean;
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maxBytes?: number;
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}): (filePath: string) => Promise<Buffer> {
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const rootDir = path.resolve(params.rootDir);
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return async (filePath: string) => {
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const safeRead = await readPathWithinRoot({
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rootDir,
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filePath,
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rejectHardlinks: params.rejectHardlinks,
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maxBytes: params.maxBytes,
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});
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return safeRead.buffer;
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};
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}
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export async function readLocalFileSafely(params: {
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filePath: string;
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maxBytes?: number;
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57
src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.test.ts
Normal file
57
src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.test.ts
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
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import fs from "node:fs/promises";
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import os from "node:os";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import type { OpenClawConfig } from "../../config/config.js";
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import {
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hydrateAttachmentParamsForAction,
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normalizeSandboxMediaParams,
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} from "./message-action-params.js";
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const cfg = {} as OpenClawConfig;
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const maybeIt = process.platform === "win32" ? it.skip : it;
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describe("message action sandbox media hydration", () => {
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maybeIt("rejects symlink retarget escapes after sandbox media normalization", async () => {
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const sandboxRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "msg-params-sandbox-"));
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const outsideRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "msg-params-outside-"));
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try {
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const insideDir = path.join(sandboxRoot, "inside");
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await fs.mkdir(insideDir, { recursive: true });
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await fs.writeFile(path.join(insideDir, "note.txt"), "INSIDE_SECRET", "utf8");
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await fs.writeFile(path.join(outsideRoot, "note.txt"), "OUTSIDE_SECRET", "utf8");
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const slotLink = path.join(sandboxRoot, "slot");
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await fs.symlink(insideDir, slotLink);
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const args: Record<string, unknown> = {
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media: "slot/note.txt",
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};
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const mediaPolicy = {
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mode: "sandbox",
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sandboxRoot,
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} as const;
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await normalizeSandboxMediaParams({
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args,
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mediaPolicy,
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});
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await fs.rm(slotLink, { recursive: true, force: true });
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await fs.symlink(outsideRoot, slotLink);
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await expect(
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hydrateAttachmentParamsForAction({
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cfg,
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channel: "slack",
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args,
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action: "sendAttachment",
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mediaPolicy,
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}),
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).rejects.toThrow(/outside workspace root|outside/i);
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} finally {
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await fs.rm(sandboxRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
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await fs.rm(outsideRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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});
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});
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@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
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import fs from "node:fs/promises";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
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import { assertMediaNotDataUrl, resolveSandboxedMediaSource } from "../../agents/sandbox-paths.js";
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@@ -9,6 +8,7 @@ import type {
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ChannelThreadingToolContext,
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} from "../../channels/plugins/types.js";
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import type { OpenClawConfig } from "../../config/config.js";
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import { createRootScopedReadFile } from "../../infra/fs-safe.js";
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import { extensionForMime } from "../../media/mime.js";
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import { parseSlackTarget } from "../../slack/targets.js";
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import { parseTelegramTarget } from "../../telegram/targets.js";
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@@ -210,10 +210,13 @@ function buildAttachmentMediaLoadOptions(params: {
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localRoots?: readonly string[];
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} {
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if (params.policy.mode === "sandbox") {
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const readSandboxFile = createRootScopedReadFile({
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rootDir: params.policy.sandboxRoot.trim(),
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});
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return {
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maxBytes: params.maxBytes,
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sandboxValidated: true,
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readFile: (filePath: string) => fs.readFile(filePath),
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readFile: readSandboxFile,
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};
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}
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return {
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