diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 2f0d5b740c7..1d182a29c7d 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
 - Security/macOS app beta: enforce path-only `system.run` allowlist matching (drop basename matches like `echo`), migrate legacy basename entries to last resolved paths when available, and harden shell-chain handling to fail closed on unsafe parse/control syntax (including quoted command substitution/backticks). This is an optional allowlist-mode feature; default installs remain deny-by-default. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/SSRF: expand IPv4 fetch guard blocking to include RFC special-use/non-global ranges (including benchmarking, TEST-NET, multicast, and reserved/broadcast blocks), and centralize range checks into a single CIDR policy table to reduce classifier drift.
 - Security/Archive: block zip symlink escapes during archive extraction.
+- Security/Media sandbox: keep tmp media allowance for absolute tmp paths only and enforce symlink-escape checks before sandbox-validated reads, preventing tmp symlink exfiltration and relative `../` sandbox escapes when sandboxes live under tmp. (#17892) Thanks @dashed.
 - Security/Discord: add `openclaw security audit` warnings for name/tag-based Discord allowlist entries (DM allowlists, guild/channel `users`, and pairing-store entries), highlighting slug-collision risk while keeping name-based matching supported, and canonicalize resolved Discord allowlist names to IDs at runtime without rewriting config files. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
 - Security/Gateway: block node-role connections when device identity metadata is missing.
 - Security/Media: enforce inbound media byte limits during download/read across Discord, Telegram, Zalo, Microsoft Teams, and BlueBubbles to prevent oversized payload memory spikes before rejection. This ships in the next npm release. Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
diff --git a/src/agents/sandbox-paths.test.ts b/src/agents/sandbox-paths.test.ts
index 0969c855086..b31c22a53df 100644
--- a/src/agents/sandbox-paths.test.ts
+++ b/src/agents/sandbox-paths.test.ts
@@ -88,6 +88,39 @@ describe("resolveSandboxedMediaSource", () => {
     }
   });
 
+  it("rejects relative traversal outside sandbox even when sandbox root is under tmpdir", async () => {
+    const sandboxDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "sandbox-media-"));
+    try {
+      await expect(
+        resolveSandboxedMediaSource({
+          media: "../outside-sandbox.png",
+          sandboxRoot: sandboxDir,
+        }),
+      ).rejects.toThrow(/sandbox/i);
+    } finally {
+      await fs.rm(sandboxDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("rejects symlinked tmpdir paths escaping tmpdir", async () => {
+    if (process.platform === "win32") {
+      return;
+    }
+    const sandboxDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "sandbox-media-"));
+    const symlinkPath = path.join(sandboxDir, "tmp-link-escape");
+    try {
+      await fs.symlink("/etc/passwd", symlinkPath);
+      await expect(
+        resolveSandboxedMediaSource({
+          media: symlinkPath,
+          sandboxRoot: sandboxDir,
+        }),
+      ).rejects.toThrow(/symlink|sandbox/i);
+    } finally {
+      await fs.rm(sandboxDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
   it("rejects file:// URLs outside sandbox", async () => {
     const sandboxDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "sandbox-media-"));
     try {
diff --git a/src/agents/sandbox-paths.ts b/src/agents/sandbox-paths.ts
index 8dbe822d3fd..f18b818245a 100644
--- a/src/agents/sandbox-paths.ts
+++ b/src/agents/sandbox-paths.ts
@@ -90,10 +90,11 @@ export async function resolveSandboxedMediaSource(params: {
       throw new Error(`Invalid file:// URL for sandboxed media: ${raw}`);
     }
   }
-  // Allow files under os.tmpdir() — consistent with buildMediaLocalRoots() defaults.
-  const resolved = path.resolve(params.sandboxRoot, candidate);
-  const tmpDir = os.tmpdir();
-  if (resolved === tmpDir || resolved.startsWith(tmpDir + path.sep)) {
+  const resolved = path.resolve(resolveSandboxInputPath(candidate, params.sandboxRoot));
+  const tmpDir = path.resolve(os.tmpdir());
+  const candidateIsAbsolute = path.isAbsolute(expandPath(candidate));
+  if (candidateIsAbsolute && isPathInside(tmpDir, resolved)) {
+    await assertNoSymlinkEscape(path.relative(tmpDir, resolved), tmpDir);
     return resolved;
   }
   const sandboxResult = await assertSandboxPath({