fix(security): harden root file guards and host writes

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-02-26 13:32:02 +01:00
parent 2ca2d5ab1c
commit e3385a6578
8 changed files with 387 additions and 81 deletions

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
import fs from "node:fs/promises";
import path from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import type { AgentToolResult } from "@mariozechner/pi-agent-core";
import { createEditTool, createReadTool, createWriteTool } from "@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent";
import { SafeOpenError, openFileWithinRoot, writeFileWithinRoot } from "../infra/fs-safe.js";
import { detectMime } from "../media/mime.js";
import { sniffMimeFromBase64 } from "../media/sniff-mime-from-base64.js";
import type { ImageSanitizationLimits } from "./image-sanitization.js";
@@ -665,6 +667,20 @@ export function createSandboxedEditTool(params: SandboxToolParams) {
return wrapToolParamNormalization(base, CLAUDE_PARAM_GROUPS.edit);
}
export function createHostWorkspaceWriteTool(root: string) {
const base = createWriteTool(root, {
operations: createHostWriteOperations(root),
}) as unknown as AnyAgentTool;
return wrapToolParamNormalization(base, CLAUDE_PARAM_GROUPS.write);
}
export function createHostWorkspaceEditTool(root: string) {
const base = createEditTool(root, {
operations: createHostEditOperations(root),
}) as unknown as AnyAgentTool;
return wrapToolParamNormalization(base, CLAUDE_PARAM_GROUPS.edit);
}
export function createOpenClawReadTool(
base: AnyAgentTool,
options?: OpenClawReadToolOptions,
@@ -741,6 +757,87 @@ function createSandboxEditOperations(params: SandboxToolParams) {
} as const;
}
function createHostWriteOperations(root: string) {
return {
mkdir: async (dir: string) => {
const relative = toRelativePathInRoot(root, dir, { allowRoot: true });
const resolved = relative ? path.resolve(root, relative) : path.resolve(root);
await assertSandboxPath({ filePath: resolved, cwd: root, root });
await fs.mkdir(resolved, { recursive: true });
},
writeFile: async (absolutePath: string, content: string) => {
const relative = toRelativePathInRoot(root, absolutePath);
await writeFileWithinRoot({
rootDir: root,
relativePath: relative,
data: content,
mkdir: true,
});
},
} as const;
}
function createHostEditOperations(root: string) {
return {
readFile: async (absolutePath: string) => {
const relative = toRelativePathInRoot(root, absolutePath);
const opened = await openFileWithinRoot({
rootDir: root,
relativePath: relative,
});
try {
return await opened.handle.readFile();
} finally {
await opened.handle.close().catch(() => {});
}
},
writeFile: async (absolutePath: string, content: string) => {
const relative = toRelativePathInRoot(root, absolutePath);
await writeFileWithinRoot({
rootDir: root,
relativePath: relative,
data: content,
mkdir: true,
});
},
access: async (absolutePath: string) => {
const relative = toRelativePathInRoot(root, absolutePath);
try {
const opened = await openFileWithinRoot({
rootDir: root,
relativePath: relative,
});
await opened.handle.close().catch(() => {});
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof SafeOpenError && error.code === "not-found") {
throw createFsAccessError("ENOENT", absolutePath);
}
throw error;
}
},
} as const;
}
function toRelativePathInRoot(
root: string,
candidate: string,
options?: { allowRoot?: boolean },
): string {
const rootResolved = path.resolve(root);
const resolved = path.resolve(candidate);
const relative = path.relative(rootResolved, resolved);
if (relative === "" || relative === ".") {
if (options?.allowRoot) {
return "";
}
throw new Error(`Path escapes workspace root: ${candidate}`);
}
if (relative.startsWith("..") || path.isAbsolute(relative)) {
throw new Error(`Path escapes workspace root: ${candidate}`);
}
return relative;
}
function createFsAccessError(code: string, filePath: string): NodeJS.ErrnoException {
const error = new Error(`Sandbox FS error (${code}): ${filePath}`) as NodeJS.ErrnoException;
error.code = code;