diff --git a/docs/cli/security.md b/docs/cli/security.md
index e7f966fb238..56256c6b8fd 100644
--- a/docs/cli/security.md
+++ b/docs/cli/security.md
@@ -25,14 +25,20 @@ openclaw security audit --json
 
 The audit warns when multiple DM senders share the main session and recommends **secure DM mode**: `session.dmScope="per-channel-peer"` (or `per-account-channel-peer` for multi-account channels) for shared inboxes.
 This is for cooperative/shared inbox hardening. A single Gateway shared by mutually untrusted/adversarial operators is not a recommended setup; split trust boundaries with separate gateways (or separate OS users/hosts).
+It also emits `security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic` when config suggests likely shared-user ingress (for example open DM/group policy, configured group targets, or wildcard sender rules), and reminds you that OpenClaw is a personal-assistant trust model by default.
+For intentional shared-user setups, the audit guidance is to sandbox all sessions, keep filesystem access workspace-scoped, and keep personal/private identities or credentials off that runtime.
 It also warns when small models (`<=300B`) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled.
 For webhook ingress, it warns when `hooks.defaultSessionKey` is unset, when request `sessionKey` overrides are enabled, and when overrides are enabled without `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes`.
-It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when `gateway.nodes.denyCommands` uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries, when `gateway.nodes.allowCommands` explicitly enables dangerous node commands, when global `tools.profile="minimal"` is overridden by agent tool profiles, when open groups expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards, and when installed extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy.
+It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when `gateway.nodes.denyCommands` uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries (exact node command-name matching only, not shell-text filtering), when `gateway.nodes.allowCommands` explicitly enables dangerous node commands, when global `tools.profile="minimal"` is overridden by agent tool profiles, when open groups expose runtime/filesystem tools without sandbox/workspace guards, and when installed extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy.
+It also flags `gateway.allowRealIpFallback=true` (header-spoofing risk if proxies are misconfigured) and `discovery.mdns.mode="full"` (metadata leakage via mDNS TXT records).
 It also warns when sandbox browser uses Docker `bridge` network without `sandbox.browser.cdpSourceRange`.
+It also flags dangerous sandbox Docker network modes (including `host` and `container:*` namespace joins).
 It also warns when existing sandbox browser Docker containers have missing/stale hash labels (for example pre-migration containers missing `openclaw.browserConfigEpoch`) and recommends `openclaw sandbox recreate --browser --all`.
 It also warns when npm-based plugin/hook install records are unpinned, missing integrity metadata, or drift from currently installed package versions.
-It warns when Discord allowlists (`channels.discord.allowFrom`, `channels.discord.guilds.*.users`, pairing store) use name or tag entries instead of stable IDs.
+It warns when channel allowlists rely on mutable names/emails/tags instead of stable IDs (Discord, Slack, Google Chat, MS Teams, Mattermost, IRC scopes where applicable).
 It warns when `gateway.auth.mode="none"` leaves Gateway HTTP APIs reachable without a shared secret (`/tools/invoke` plus any enabled `/v1/*` endpoint).
+Settings prefixed with `dangerous`/`dangerously` are explicit break-glass operator overrides; enabling one is not, by itself, a security vulnerability report.
+For the complete dangerous-parameter inventory, see the "Insecure or dangerous flags summary" section in [Security](/gateway/security).
 
 ## Skill security