Fixes the pairing required regression from #21236 for legacy paired devices
created without roles/scopes metadata. Detects legacy paired metadata shape
and skips upgrade enforcement while backfilling metadata in place on reconnect.
Co-authored-by: Josh Avant <830519+joshavant@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Val Alexander <68980965+BunsDev@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(gateway): add auth rate-limiting & brute-force protection
Add a per-IP sliding-window rate limiter to Gateway authentication
endpoints (HTTP, WebSocket upgrade, and WS message-level auth).
When gateway.auth.rateLimit is configured, failed auth attempts are
tracked per client IP. Once the threshold is exceeded within the
sliding window, further attempts are blocked with HTTP 429 + Retry-After
until the lockout period expires. Loopback addresses are exempt by
default so local CLI sessions are never locked out.
The limiter is only created when explicitly configured (undefined
otherwise), keeping the feature fully opt-in and backward-compatible.
* fix(gateway): isolate auth rate-limit scopes and normalize 429 responses
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Co-authored-by: buerbaumer <buerbaumer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
* fix(gateway): prevent auth bypass when behind unconfigured reverse proxy
When proxy headers (X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP) are present but
gateway.trustedProxies is not configured, the gateway now treats
connections as non-local. This prevents a scenario where all proxied
requests appear to come from localhost and receive automatic trust.
Previously, running behind nginx/Caddy without configuring trustedProxies
would cause isLocalClient=true for all external connections, potentially
bypassing authentication and auto-approving device pairing.
The gateway now logs a warning when this condition is detected, guiding
operators to configure trustedProxies for proper client IP detection.
Also adds documentation for reverse proxy security configuration.
* fix: harden reverse proxy auth (#1795) (thanks @orlyjamie)
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Co-authored-by: orlyjamie <orlyjamie@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Peter Steinberger <steipete@gmail.com>
The device identity check was rejecting connections before token
authentication could be attempted. This broke the control-ui (web UI)
which uses token-based authentication via URL parameter.
Changes:
- Skip device identity requirement when a token is provided
- Guard device token verification to only run when device is present
Fixes control-ui showing "device identity required" error when
connecting with a valid token.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
