import {
  hasConfiguredUnavailableCredentialStatus,
  hasResolvedCredentialValue,
} from "../channels/account-snapshot-fields.js";
import { resolveChannelDefaultAccountId } from "../channels/plugins/helpers.js";
import type { listChannelPlugins } from "../channels/plugins/index.js";
import type { ChannelId } from "../channels/plugins/types.js";
import { inspectReadOnlyChannelAccount } from "../channels/read-only-account-inspect.js";
import {
  isNumericTelegramUserId,
  normalizeTelegramAllowFromEntry,
} from "../channels/telegram/allow-from.js";
import { formatCliCommand } from "../cli/command-format.js";
import { resolveNativeCommandsEnabled, resolveNativeSkillsEnabled } from "../config/commands.js";
import type { OpenClawConfig } from "../config/config.js";
import { isDangerousNameMatchingEnabled } from "../config/dangerous-name-matching.js";
import { readChannelAllowFromStore } from "../pairing/pairing-store.js";
import { normalizeStringEntries } from "../shared/string-normalization.js";
import type { SecurityAuditFinding, SecurityAuditSeverity } from "./audit.js";
import { resolveDmAllowState } from "./dm-policy-shared.js";
import {
  isDiscordMutableAllowEntry,
  isZalouserMutableGroupEntry,
} from "./mutable-allowlist-detectors.js";

function normalizeAllowFromList(list: Array<string | number> | undefined | null): string[] {
  return normalizeStringEntries(Array.isArray(list) ? list : undefined);
}

function addDiscordNameBasedEntries(params: {
  target: Set<string>;
  values: unknown;
  source: string;
}): void {
  if (!Array.isArray(params.values)) {
    return;
  }
  for (const value of params.values) {
    if (!isDiscordMutableAllowEntry(String(value))) {
      continue;
    }
    const text = String(value).trim();
    if (!text) {
      continue;
    }
    params.target.add(`${params.source}:${text}`);
  }
}

function addZalouserMutableGroupEntries(params: {
  target: Set<string>;
  groups: unknown;
  source: string;
}): void {
  if (!params.groups || typeof params.groups !== "object" || Array.isArray(params.groups)) {
    return;
  }
  for (const key of Object.keys(params.groups as Record<string, unknown>)) {
    if (!isZalouserMutableGroupEntry(key)) {
      continue;
    }
    params.target.add(`${params.source}:${key}`);
  }
}

function collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries(params: {
  entries: unknown;
  target: Set<string>;
}): void {
  if (!Array.isArray(params.entries)) {
    return;
  }
  for (const entry of params.entries) {
    const normalized = normalizeTelegramAllowFromEntry(entry);
    if (!normalized || normalized === "*") {
      continue;
    }
    if (!isNumericTelegramUserId(normalized)) {
      params.target.add(normalized);
    }
  }
}

function classifyChannelWarningSeverity(message: string): SecurityAuditSeverity {
  const s = message.toLowerCase();
  if (
    s.includes("dms: open") ||
    s.includes('grouppolicy="open"') ||
    s.includes('dmpolicy="open"')
  ) {
    return "critical";
  }
  if (s.includes("allows any") || s.includes("anyone can dm") || s.includes("public")) {
    return "critical";
  }
  if (s.includes("locked") || s.includes("disabled")) {
    return "info";
  }
  return "warn";
}

function dedupeFindings(findings: SecurityAuditFinding[]): SecurityAuditFinding[] {
  const seen = new Set<string>();
  const out: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
  for (const finding of findings) {
    const key = [
      finding.checkId,
      finding.severity,
      finding.title,
      finding.detail ?? "",
      finding.remediation ?? "",
    ].join("\n");
    if (seen.has(key)) {
      continue;
    }
    seen.add(key);
    out.push(finding);
  }
  return out;
}

function hasExplicitProviderAccountConfig(
  cfg: OpenClawConfig,
  provider: string,
  accountId: string,
): boolean {
  const channel = cfg.channels?.[provider];
  if (!channel || typeof channel !== "object") {
    return false;
  }
  const accounts = (channel as { accounts?: Record<string, unknown> }).accounts;
  if (!accounts || typeof accounts !== "object") {
    return false;
  }
  return Object.hasOwn(accounts, accountId);
}

export async function collectChannelSecurityFindings(params: {
  cfg: OpenClawConfig;
  sourceConfig?: OpenClawConfig;
  plugins: ReturnType<typeof listChannelPlugins>;
}): Promise<SecurityAuditFinding[]> {
  const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
  const sourceConfig = params.sourceConfig ?? params.cfg;

  const inspectChannelAccount = (
    plugin: (typeof params.plugins)[number],
    cfg: OpenClawConfig,
    accountId: string,
  ) =>
    plugin.config.inspectAccount?.(cfg, accountId) ??
    inspectReadOnlyChannelAccount({
      channelId: plugin.id,
      cfg,
      accountId,
    });

  const asAccountRecord = (value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> | null =>
    value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value)
      ? (value as Record<string, unknown>)
      : null;

  const resolveChannelAuditAccount = async (
    plugin: (typeof params.plugins)[number],
    accountId: string,
  ) => {
    const sourceInspectedAccount = inspectChannelAccount(plugin, sourceConfig, accountId);
    const resolvedInspectedAccount = inspectChannelAccount(plugin, params.cfg, accountId);
    const sourceInspection = sourceInspectedAccount as {
      enabled?: boolean;
      configured?: boolean;
    } | null;
    const resolvedInspection = resolvedInspectedAccount as {
      enabled?: boolean;
      configured?: boolean;
    } | null;
    const resolvedAccount =
      resolvedInspectedAccount ?? plugin.config.resolveAccount(params.cfg, accountId);
    const useSourceUnavailableAccount = Boolean(
      sourceInspectedAccount &&
      hasConfiguredUnavailableCredentialStatus(sourceInspectedAccount) &&
      (!hasResolvedCredentialValue(resolvedAccount) ||
        (sourceInspection?.configured === true && resolvedInspection?.configured === false)),
    );
    const account = useSourceUnavailableAccount ? sourceInspectedAccount : resolvedAccount;
    const selectedInspection = useSourceUnavailableAccount ? sourceInspection : resolvedInspection;
    const accountRecord = asAccountRecord(account);
    const enabled =
      typeof selectedInspection?.enabled === "boolean"
        ? selectedInspection.enabled
        : typeof accountRecord?.enabled === "boolean"
          ? accountRecord.enabled
          : plugin.config.isEnabled
            ? plugin.config.isEnabled(account, params.cfg)
            : true;
    const configured =
      typeof selectedInspection?.configured === "boolean"
        ? selectedInspection.configured
        : typeof accountRecord?.configured === "boolean"
          ? accountRecord.configured
          : plugin.config.isConfigured
            ? await plugin.config.isConfigured(account, params.cfg)
            : true;
    return { account, enabled, configured };
  };

  const coerceNativeSetting = (value: unknown): boolean | "auto" | undefined => {
    if (value === true) {
      return true;
    }
    if (value === false) {
      return false;
    }
    if (value === "auto") {
      return "auto";
    }
    return undefined;
  };

  const warnDmPolicy = async (input: {
    label: string;
    provider: ChannelId;
    accountId: string;
    dmPolicy: string;
    allowFrom?: Array<string | number> | null;
    policyPath?: string;
    allowFromPath: string;
    normalizeEntry?: (raw: string) => string;
  }) => {
    const policyPath = input.policyPath ?? `${input.allowFromPath}policy`;
    const { hasWildcard, isMultiUserDm } = await resolveDmAllowState({
      provider: input.provider,
      accountId: input.accountId,
      allowFrom: input.allowFrom,
      normalizeEntry: input.normalizeEntry,
    });
    const dmScope = params.cfg.session?.dmScope ?? "main";

    if (input.dmPolicy === "open") {
      const allowFromKey = `${input.allowFromPath}allowFrom`;
      findings.push({
        checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.open`,
        severity: "critical",
        title: `${input.label} DMs are open`,
        detail: `${policyPath}="open" allows anyone to DM the bot.`,
        remediation: `Use pairing/allowlist; if you really need open DMs, ensure ${allowFromKey} includes "*".`,
      });
      if (!hasWildcard) {
        findings.push({
          checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.open_invalid`,
          severity: "warn",
          title: `${input.label} DM config looks inconsistent`,
          detail: `"open" requires ${allowFromKey} to include "*".`,
        });
      }
    }

    if (input.dmPolicy === "disabled") {
      findings.push({
        checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.disabled`,
        severity: "info",
        title: `${input.label} DMs are disabled`,
        detail: `${policyPath}="disabled" ignores inbound DMs.`,
      });
      return;
    }

    if (dmScope === "main" && isMultiUserDm) {
      findings.push({
        checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.scope_main_multiuser`,
        severity: "warn",
        title: `${input.label} DMs share the main session`,
        detail:
          "Multiple DM senders currently share the main session, which can leak context across users.",
        remediation:
          "Run: " +
          formatCliCommand('openclaw config set session.dmScope "per-channel-peer"') +
          ' (or "per-account-channel-peer" for multi-account channels) to isolate DM sessions per sender.',
      });
    }
  };

  for (const plugin of params.plugins) {
    if (!plugin.security) {
      continue;
    }
    const accountIds = plugin.config.listAccountIds(sourceConfig);
    const defaultAccountId = resolveChannelDefaultAccountId({
      plugin,
      cfg: sourceConfig,
      accountIds,
    });
    const orderedAccountIds = Array.from(new Set([defaultAccountId, ...accountIds]));

    for (const accountId of orderedAccountIds) {
      const hasExplicitAccountPath = hasExplicitProviderAccountConfig(
        sourceConfig,
        plugin.id,
        accountId,
      );
      const { account, enabled, configured } = await resolveChannelAuditAccount(plugin, accountId);
      if (!enabled) {
        continue;
      }
      if (!configured) {
        continue;
      }

      const accountConfig = (account as { config?: Record<string, unknown> } | null | undefined)
        ?.config;
      if (isDangerousNameMatchingEnabled(accountConfig)) {
        const accountNote =
          orderedAccountIds.length > 1 || hasExplicitAccountPath ? ` (account: ${accountId})` : "";
        findings.push({
          checkId: `channels.${plugin.id}.allowFrom.dangerous_name_matching_enabled`,
          severity: "info",
          title: `${plugin.meta.label ?? plugin.id} dangerous name matching is enabled${accountNote}`,
          detail:
            "dangerouslyAllowNameMatching=true re-enables mutable name/email/tag matching for sender authorization. This is a break-glass compatibility mode, not a hardened default.",
          remediation:
            "Prefer stable sender IDs in allowlists, then disable dangerouslyAllowNameMatching.",
        });
      }

      if (plugin.id === "discord") {
        const discordCfg =
          (account as { config?: Record<string, unknown> } | null)?.config ??
          ({} as Record<string, unknown>);
        const dangerousNameMatchingEnabled = isDangerousNameMatchingEnabled(discordCfg);
        const storeAllowFrom = await readChannelAllowFromStore(
          "discord",
          process.env,
          accountId,
        ).catch(() => []);
        const discordNameBasedAllowEntries = new Set<string>();
        const discordPathPrefix =
          orderedAccountIds.length > 1 || hasExplicitAccountPath
            ? `channels.discord.accounts.${accountId}`
            : "channels.discord";
        addDiscordNameBasedEntries({
          target: discordNameBasedAllowEntries,
          values: discordCfg.allowFrom,
          source: `${discordPathPrefix}.allowFrom`,
        });
        addDiscordNameBasedEntries({
          target: discordNameBasedAllowEntries,
          values: (discordCfg.dm as { allowFrom?: unknown } | undefined)?.allowFrom,
          source: `${discordPathPrefix}.dm.allowFrom`,
        });
        addDiscordNameBasedEntries({
          target: discordNameBasedAllowEntries,
          values: storeAllowFrom,
          source: "~/.openclaw/credentials/discord-allowFrom.json",
        });
        const discordGuildEntries =
          (discordCfg.guilds as Record<string, unknown> | undefined) ?? {};
        for (const [guildKey, guildValue] of Object.entries(discordGuildEntries)) {
          if (!guildValue || typeof guildValue !== "object") {
            continue;
          }
          const guild = guildValue as Record<string, unknown>;
          addDiscordNameBasedEntries({
            target: discordNameBasedAllowEntries,
            values: guild.users,
            source: `${discordPathPrefix}.guilds.${guildKey}.users`,
          });
          const channels = guild.channels;
          if (!channels || typeof channels !== "object") {
            continue;
          }
          for (const [channelKey, channelValue] of Object.entries(
            channels as Record<string, unknown>,
          )) {
            if (!channelValue || typeof channelValue !== "object") {
              continue;
            }
            const channel = channelValue as Record<string, unknown>;
            addDiscordNameBasedEntries({
              target: discordNameBasedAllowEntries,
              values: channel.users,
              source: `${discordPathPrefix}.guilds.${guildKey}.channels.${channelKey}.users`,
            });
          }
        }
        if (discordNameBasedAllowEntries.size > 0) {
          const examples = Array.from(discordNameBasedAllowEntries).slice(0, 5);
          const more =
            discordNameBasedAllowEntries.size > examples.length
              ? ` (+${discordNameBasedAllowEntries.size - examples.length} more)`
              : "";
          findings.push({
            checkId: "channels.discord.allowFrom.name_based_entries",
            severity: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled ? "info" : "warn",
            title: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled
              ? "Discord allowlist uses break-glass name/tag matching"
              : "Discord allowlist contains name or tag entries",
            detail: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled
              ? "Discord name/tag allowlist matching is explicitly enabled via dangerouslyAllowNameMatching. This mutable-identity mode is operator-selected break-glass behavior and out-of-scope for vulnerability reports by itself. " +
                `Found: ${examples.join(", ")}${more}.`
              : "Discord name/tag allowlist matching uses normalized slugs and can collide across users. " +
                `Found: ${examples.join(", ")}${more}.`,
            remediation: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled
              ? "Prefer stable Discord IDs (or <@id>/user:<id>/pk:<id>), then disable dangerouslyAllowNameMatching."
              : "Prefer stable Discord IDs (or <@id>/user:<id>/pk:<id>) in channels.discord.allowFrom and channels.discord.guilds.*.users, or explicitly opt in with dangerouslyAllowNameMatching=true if you accept the risk.",
          });
        }
        const nativeEnabled = resolveNativeCommandsEnabled({
          providerId: "discord",
          providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(
            (discordCfg.commands as { native?: unknown } | undefined)?.native,
          ),
          globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.native,
        });
        const nativeSkillsEnabled = resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
          providerId: "discord",
          providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(
            (discordCfg.commands as { nativeSkills?: unknown } | undefined)?.nativeSkills,
          ),
          globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills,
        });
        const slashEnabled = nativeEnabled || nativeSkillsEnabled;
        if (slashEnabled) {
          const defaultGroupPolicy = params.cfg.channels?.defaults?.groupPolicy;
          const groupPolicy =
            (discordCfg.groupPolicy as string | undefined) ?? defaultGroupPolicy ?? "allowlist";
          const guildEntries = discordGuildEntries;
          const guildsConfigured = Object.keys(guildEntries).length > 0;
          const hasAnyUserAllowlist = Object.values(guildEntries).some((guild) => {
            if (!guild || typeof guild !== "object") {
              return false;
            }
            const g = guild as Record<string, unknown>;
            if (Array.isArray(g.users) && g.users.length > 0) {
              return true;
            }
            const channels = g.channels;
            if (!channels || typeof channels !== "object") {
              return false;
            }
            return Object.values(channels as Record<string, unknown>).some((channel) => {
              if (!channel || typeof channel !== "object") {
                return false;
              }
              const c = channel as Record<string, unknown>;
              return Array.isArray(c.users) && c.users.length > 0;
            });
          });
          const dmAllowFromRaw = (discordCfg.dm as { allowFrom?: unknown } | undefined)?.allowFrom;
          const dmAllowFrom = Array.isArray(dmAllowFromRaw) ? dmAllowFromRaw : [];
          const ownerAllowFromConfigured =
            normalizeAllowFromList([...dmAllowFrom, ...storeAllowFrom]).length > 0;

          const useAccessGroups = params.cfg.commands?.useAccessGroups !== false;
          if (
            !useAccessGroups &&
            groupPolicy !== "disabled" &&
            guildsConfigured &&
            !hasAnyUserAllowlist
          ) {
            findings.push({
              checkId: "channels.discord.commands.native.unrestricted",
              severity: "critical",
              title: "Discord slash commands are unrestricted",
              detail:
                "commands.useAccessGroups=false disables sender allowlists for Discord slash commands unless a per-guild/channel users allowlist is configured; with no users allowlist, any user in allowed guild channels can invoke /… commands.",
              remediation:
                "Set commands.useAccessGroups=true (recommended), or configure channels.discord.guilds.<id>.users (or channels.discord.guilds.<id>.channels.<channel>.users).",
            });
          } else if (
            useAccessGroups &&
            groupPolicy !== "disabled" &&
            guildsConfigured &&
            !ownerAllowFromConfigured &&
            !hasAnyUserAllowlist
          ) {
            findings.push({
              checkId: "channels.discord.commands.native.no_allowlists",
              severity: "warn",
              title: "Discord slash commands have no allowlists",
              detail:
                "Discord slash commands are enabled, but neither an owner allowFrom list nor any per-guild/channel users allowlist is configured; /… commands will be rejected for everyone.",
              remediation:
                "Add your user id to channels.discord.allowFrom (or approve yourself via pairing), or configure channels.discord.guilds.<id>.users.",
            });
          }
        }
      }

      if (plugin.id === "zalouser") {
        const zalouserCfg =
          (account as { config?: Record<string, unknown> } | null)?.config ??
          ({} as Record<string, unknown>);
        const dangerousNameMatchingEnabled = isDangerousNameMatchingEnabled(zalouserCfg);
        const zalouserPathPrefix =
          orderedAccountIds.length > 1 || hasExplicitAccountPath
            ? `channels.zalouser.accounts.${accountId}`
            : "channels.zalouser";
        const mutableGroupEntries = new Set<string>();
        addZalouserMutableGroupEntries({
          target: mutableGroupEntries,
          groups: zalouserCfg.groups,
          source: `${zalouserPathPrefix}.groups`,
        });
        if (mutableGroupEntries.size > 0) {
          const examples = Array.from(mutableGroupEntries).slice(0, 5);
          const more =
            mutableGroupEntries.size > examples.length
              ? ` (+${mutableGroupEntries.size - examples.length} more)`
              : "";
          findings.push({
            checkId: "channels.zalouser.groups.mutable_entries",
            severity: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled ? "info" : "warn",
            title: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled
              ? "Zalouser group routing uses break-glass name matching"
              : "Zalouser group routing contains mutable group entries",
            detail: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled
              ? "Zalouser group-name routing is explicitly enabled via dangerouslyAllowNameMatching. This mutable-identity mode is operator-selected break-glass behavior and out-of-scope for vulnerability reports by itself. " +
                `Found: ${examples.join(", ")}${more}.`
              : "Zalouser group auth is ID-only by default, so unresolved group-name or slug entries are ignored for auth and can drift from the intended trusted group. " +
                `Found: ${examples.join(", ")}${more}.`,
            remediation: dangerousNameMatchingEnabled
              ? "Prefer stable Zalo group IDs (for example group:<id> or provider-native g- ids), then disable dangerouslyAllowNameMatching."
              : "Prefer stable Zalo group IDs in channels.zalouser.groups, or explicitly opt in with dangerouslyAllowNameMatching=true if you accept mutable group-name matching.",
          });
        }
      }

      if (plugin.id === "slack") {
        const slackCfg =
          (account as { config?: Record<string, unknown>; dm?: Record<string, unknown> } | null)
            ?.config ?? ({} as Record<string, unknown>);
        const nativeEnabled = resolveNativeCommandsEnabled({
          providerId: "slack",
          providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(
            (slackCfg.commands as { native?: unknown } | undefined)?.native,
          ),
          globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.native,
        });
        const nativeSkillsEnabled = resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
          providerId: "slack",
          providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(
            (slackCfg.commands as { nativeSkills?: unknown } | undefined)?.nativeSkills,
          ),
          globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills,
        });
        const slashCommandEnabled =
          nativeEnabled ||
          nativeSkillsEnabled ||
          (slackCfg.slashCommand as { enabled?: unknown } | undefined)?.enabled === true;
        if (slashCommandEnabled) {
          const useAccessGroups = params.cfg.commands?.useAccessGroups !== false;
          if (!useAccessGroups) {
            findings.push({
              checkId: "channels.slack.commands.slash.useAccessGroups_off",
              severity: "critical",
              title: "Slack slash commands bypass access groups",
              detail:
                "Slack slash/native commands are enabled while commands.useAccessGroups=false; this can allow unrestricted /… command execution from channels/users you didn't explicitly authorize.",
              remediation: "Set commands.useAccessGroups=true (recommended).",
            });
          } else {
            const allowFromRaw = (
              account as
                | { config?: { allowFrom?: unknown }; dm?: { allowFrom?: unknown } }
                | null
                | undefined
            )?.config?.allowFrom;
            const legacyAllowFromRaw = (
              account as { dm?: { allowFrom?: unknown } } | null | undefined
            )?.dm?.allowFrom;
            const allowFrom = Array.isArray(allowFromRaw)
              ? allowFromRaw
              : Array.isArray(legacyAllowFromRaw)
                ? legacyAllowFromRaw
                : [];
            const storeAllowFrom = await readChannelAllowFromStore(
              "slack",
              process.env,
              accountId,
            ).catch(() => []);
            const ownerAllowFromConfigured =
              normalizeAllowFromList([...allowFrom, ...storeAllowFrom]).length > 0;
            const channels = (slackCfg.channels as Record<string, unknown> | undefined) ?? {};
            const hasAnyChannelUsersAllowlist = Object.values(channels).some((value) => {
              if (!value || typeof value !== "object") {
                return false;
              }
              const channel = value as Record<string, unknown>;
              return Array.isArray(channel.users) && channel.users.length > 0;
            });
            if (!ownerAllowFromConfigured && !hasAnyChannelUsersAllowlist) {
              findings.push({
                checkId: "channels.slack.commands.slash.no_allowlists",
                severity: "warn",
                title: "Slack slash commands have no allowlists",
                detail:
                  "Slack slash/native commands are enabled, but neither an owner allowFrom list nor any channels.<id>.users allowlist is configured; /… commands will be rejected for everyone.",
                remediation:
                  "Approve yourself via pairing (recommended), or set channels.slack.allowFrom and/or channels.slack.channels.<id>.users.",
              });
            }
          }
        }
      }

      const dmPolicy = plugin.security.resolveDmPolicy?.({
        cfg: params.cfg,
        accountId,
        account,
      });
      if (dmPolicy) {
        await warnDmPolicy({
          label: plugin.meta.label ?? plugin.id,
          provider: plugin.id,
          accountId,
          dmPolicy: dmPolicy.policy,
          allowFrom: dmPolicy.allowFrom,
          policyPath: dmPolicy.policyPath,
          allowFromPath: dmPolicy.allowFromPath,
          normalizeEntry: dmPolicy.normalizeEntry,
        });
      }

      if (plugin.security.collectWarnings) {
        const warnings = await plugin.security.collectWarnings({
          cfg: params.cfg,
          accountId,
          account,
        });
        for (const message of warnings ?? []) {
          const trimmed = String(message).trim();
          if (!trimmed) {
            continue;
          }
          findings.push({
            checkId: `channels.${plugin.id}.warning.${findings.length + 1}`,
            severity: classifyChannelWarningSeverity(trimmed),
            title: `${plugin.meta.label ?? plugin.id} security warning`,
            detail: trimmed.replace(/^-\s*/, ""),
          });
        }
      }

      if (plugin.id !== "telegram") {
        continue;
      }

      const allowTextCommands = params.cfg.commands?.text !== false;
      if (!allowTextCommands) {
        continue;
      }

      const telegramCfg =
        (account as { config?: Record<string, unknown> } | null)?.config ??
        ({} as Record<string, unknown>);
      const defaultGroupPolicy = params.cfg.channels?.defaults?.groupPolicy;
      const groupPolicy =
        (telegramCfg.groupPolicy as string | undefined) ?? defaultGroupPolicy ?? "allowlist";
      const groups = telegramCfg.groups as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
      const groupsConfigured = Boolean(groups) && Object.keys(groups ?? {}).length > 0;
      const groupAccessPossible =
        groupPolicy === "open" || (groupPolicy === "allowlist" && groupsConfigured);
      if (!groupAccessPossible) {
        continue;
      }

      const storeAllowFrom = await readChannelAllowFromStore(
        "telegram",
        process.env,
        accountId,
      ).catch(() => []);
      const storeHasWildcard = storeAllowFrom.some((v) => String(v).trim() === "*");
      const invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries = new Set<string>();
      collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries({
        entries: storeAllowFrom,
        target: invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries,
      });
      const groupAllowFrom = Array.isArray(telegramCfg.groupAllowFrom)
        ? telegramCfg.groupAllowFrom
        : [];
      const groupAllowFromHasWildcard = groupAllowFrom.some((v) => String(v).trim() === "*");
      collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries({
        entries: groupAllowFrom,
        target: invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries,
      });
      const dmAllowFrom = Array.isArray(telegramCfg.allowFrom) ? telegramCfg.allowFrom : [];
      collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries({
        entries: dmAllowFrom,
        target: invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries,
      });
      const anyGroupOverride = Boolean(
        groups &&
        Object.values(groups).some((value) => {
          if (!value || typeof value !== "object") {
            return false;
          }
          const group = value as Record<string, unknown>;
          const allowFrom = Array.isArray(group.allowFrom) ? group.allowFrom : [];
          if (allowFrom.length > 0) {
            collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries({
              entries: allowFrom,
              target: invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries,
            });
            return true;
          }
          const topics = group.topics;
          if (!topics || typeof topics !== "object") {
            return false;
          }
          return Object.values(topics as Record<string, unknown>).some((topicValue) => {
            if (!topicValue || typeof topicValue !== "object") {
              return false;
            }
            const topic = topicValue as Record<string, unknown>;
            const topicAllow = Array.isArray(topic.allowFrom) ? topic.allowFrom : [];
            collectInvalidTelegramAllowFromEntries({
              entries: topicAllow,
              target: invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries,
            });
            return topicAllow.length > 0;
          });
        }),
      );

      const hasAnySenderAllowlist =
        storeAllowFrom.length > 0 || groupAllowFrom.length > 0 || anyGroupOverride;

      if (invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.size > 0) {
        const examples = Array.from(invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries).slice(0, 5);
        const more =
          invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.size > examples.length
            ? ` (+${invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.size - examples.length} more)`
            : "";
        findings.push({
          checkId: "channels.telegram.allowFrom.invalid_entries",
          severity: "warn",
          title: "Telegram allowlist contains non-numeric entries",
          detail:
            "Telegram sender authorization requires numeric Telegram user IDs. " +
            `Found non-numeric allowFrom entries: ${examples.join(", ")}${more}.`,
          remediation:
            "Replace @username entries with numeric Telegram user IDs (use onboarding to resolve), then re-run the audit.",
        });
      }

      if (storeHasWildcard || groupAllowFromHasWildcard) {
        findings.push({
          checkId: "channels.telegram.groups.allowFrom.wildcard",
          severity: "critical",
          title: "Telegram group allowlist contains wildcard",
          detail:
            'Telegram group sender allowlist contains "*", which allows any group member to run /… commands and control directives.',
          remediation:
            'Remove "*" from channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom and pairing store; prefer explicit numeric Telegram user IDs.',
        });
        continue;
      }

      if (!hasAnySenderAllowlist) {
        const providerSetting = (telegramCfg.commands as { nativeSkills?: unknown } | undefined)
          // oxlint-disable-next-line typescript/no-explicit-any
          ?.nativeSkills as any;
        const skillsEnabled = resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
          providerId: "telegram",
          providerSetting,
          globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills,
        });
        findings.push({
          checkId: "channels.telegram.groups.allowFrom.missing",
          severity: "critical",
          title: "Telegram group commands have no sender allowlist",
          detail:
            `Telegram group access is enabled but no sender allowlist is configured; this allows any group member to invoke /… commands` +
            (skillsEnabled ? " (including skill commands)." : "."),
          remediation:
            "Approve yourself via pairing (recommended), or set channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom (or per-group groups.<id>.allowFrom).",
        });
      }
    }
  }

  return dedupeFindings(findings);
}