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fix(ui): strip inbound metadata blocks and guard reply-tag streaming (clean rewrite) (#22346)
* fix(ui): strip inbound metadata blocks from user messages * chore: clean up metadata-strip format and changelog credit * Update src/shared/chat-envelope.ts Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai
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- Agents/Subagents: restore announce-chain delivery to agent injection, defer nested announce output until descendant follow-up content is ready, and prevent descendant deferrals from consuming announce retry budget so deep chains do not drop final completions. (#22223) Thanks @tyler6204.
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- Gateway/Auth: require `gateway.trustedProxies` to include a loopback proxy address when `auth.mode="trusted-proxy"` and `bind="loopback"`, preventing same-host proxy misconfiguration from silently blocking auth. (#22082, follow-up to #20097) thanks @mbelinky.
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- Security/OpenClawKit/UI: prevent injected inbound user context metadata blocks from leaking into chat history in TUI, webchat, and macOS surfaces by stripping all untrusted metadata prefixes at display boundaries. (#22142) Thanks @Mellowambience, @vincentkoc.
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- Security/OpenClawKit/UI: prevent inbound metadata leaks and reply-tag streaming artifacts in TUI rendering by stripping untrusted metadata prefixes at display boundaries. (#22346) Thanks @akramcodez, @vincentkoc.
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- Agents/System Prompt: label allowlisted senders as authorized senders to avoid implying ownership. Thanks @thewilloftheshadow.
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- Agents/Tool display: fix exec cwd suffix inference so `pushd ... && popd ... && <command>` does not keep stale `(in <dir>)` context in summaries. (#21925) thanks @Lukavyi.
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- Gateway/Auth: allow trusted-proxy mode with loopback bind for same-host reverse-proxy deployments, while still requiring configured `gateway.trustedProxies`. (#20097) thanks @xinhuagu.
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@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ import {
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const stripTrailingDirective = (text: string): string => {
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const openIndex = text.lastIndexOf("[[");
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if (openIndex < 0) {
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if (text.endsWith("[")) {
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return text.slice(0, -1);
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}
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return text;
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}
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const closeIndex = text.indexOf("]]", openIndex + 2);
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@@ -39,4 +39,35 @@ describe("stripEnvelopeFromMessage", () => {
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const result = stripEnvelopeFromMessage(input) as { content?: string };
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expect(result.content).toBe("note\n[message_id: 123]");
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});
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test("removes inbound un-bracketed conversation info blocks from user messages", () => {
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const input = {
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role: "user",
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content:
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'Conversation info (untrusted metadata):\n```json\n{\n "message_id": "123"\n}\n```\n\nHello there',
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};
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const result = stripEnvelopeFromMessage(input) as { content?: string };
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expect(result.content).toBe("Hello there");
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});
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test("removes all inbound metadata blocks before user text", () => {
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const input = {
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role: "user",
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content:
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'Thread starter (untrusted, for context):\n```json\n{"seed": 1}\n```\n\nSender (untrusted metadata):\n```json\n{"name": "alice"}\n```\n\nActual user message',
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};
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const result = stripEnvelopeFromMessage(input) as { content?: string };
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expect(result.content).toBe("Actual user message");
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});
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test("does not strip metadata-like blocks that are not a prefix", () => {
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const input = {
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role: "user",
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content:
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'Actual text\nConversation info (untrusted metadata):\n```json\n{"message_id": "123"}\n```\n\nFollow-up',
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};
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const result = stripEnvelopeFromMessage(input) as { content?: string };
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expect(result.content).toBe(
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'Actual text\nConversation info (untrusted metadata):\n```json\n{"message_id": "123"}\n```\n\nFollow-up',
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);
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});
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});
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@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
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import { stripEnvelope, stripMessageIdHints } from "../shared/chat-envelope.js";
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import {
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stripEnvelope,
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stripInboundMetadataBlocks,
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stripMessageIdHints,
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} from "../shared/chat-envelope.js";
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export { stripEnvelope };
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@@ -12,7 +16,7 @@ function stripEnvelopeFromContent(content: unknown[]): { content: unknown[]; cha
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if (entry.type !== "text" || typeof entry.text !== "string") {
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return item;
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}
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const stripped = stripMessageIdHints(stripEnvelope(entry.text));
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const stripped = stripMessageIdHints(stripEnvelope(stripInboundMetadataBlocks(entry.text)));
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if (stripped === entry.text) {
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return item;
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}
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@@ -39,7 +43,7 @@ export function stripEnvelopeFromMessage(message: unknown): unknown {
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const next: Record<string, unknown> = { ...entry };
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if (typeof entry.content === "string") {
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const stripped = stripMessageIdHints(stripEnvelope(entry.content));
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const stripped = stripMessageIdHints(stripEnvelope(stripInboundMetadataBlocks(entry.content)));
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if (stripped !== entry.content) {
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next.content = stripped;
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changed = true;
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@@ -51,7 +55,7 @@ export function stripEnvelopeFromMessage(message: unknown): unknown {
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changed = true;
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}
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} else if (typeof entry.text === "string") {
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const stripped = stripMessageIdHints(stripEnvelope(entry.text));
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const stripped = stripMessageIdHints(stripEnvelope(stripInboundMetadataBlocks(entry.text)));
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if (stripped !== entry.text) {
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next.text = stripped;
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changed = true;
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@@ -16,6 +16,20 @@ const ENVELOPE_CHANNELS = [
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];
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const MESSAGE_ID_LINE = /^\s*\[message_id:\s*[^\]]+\]\s*$/i;
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const INBOUND_METADATA_HEADERS = [
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"Conversation info (untrusted metadata):",
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"Sender (untrusted metadata):",
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"Thread starter (untrusted, for context):",
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"Replied message (untrusted, for context):",
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"Forwarded message context (untrusted metadata):",
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"Chat history since last reply (untrusted, for context):",
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];
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const REGEX_ESCAPE_RE = /[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\\-]/g;
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const INBOUND_METADATA_PREFIX_RE = new RegExp(
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"^\\s*(?:" +
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INBOUND_METADATA_HEADERS.map((header) => header.replace(REGEX_ESCAPE_RE, "\\$&")).join("|") +
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")\\r?\\n```json\\r?\\n[\\s\\S]*?\\r?\\n```(?:\\r?\\n)*",
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);
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function looksLikeEnvelopeHeader(header: string): boolean {
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if (/\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}Z\b/.test(header)) {
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@@ -47,3 +61,15 @@ export function stripMessageIdHints(text: string): string {
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const filtered = lines.filter((line) => !MESSAGE_ID_LINE.test(line));
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return filtered.length === lines.length ? text : filtered.join("\n");
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}
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export function stripInboundMetadataBlocks(text: string): string {
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let remaining = text;
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for (;;) {
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const match = INBOUND_METADATA_PREFIX_RE.exec(remaining);
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if (!match) {
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break;
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}
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remaining = remaining.slice(match[0].length).replace(/^\r?\n+/, "");
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}
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return remaining.trim();
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}
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